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N what is becoming an increasingly commonplace scenario, Texas
taxpayers, administrators and legislators once again found themselves
caught this year in the uncertainty of a not yet "fixed" tax system.
This Survey period, which included the interim between a fourth special
legislative session and the beginning of the regular 2005 session, wit-
nessed multiple proposals, debates, and politicking about reforming
Texas taxes. The uncertainty concerning what tax changes may be en-
acted in 2005 is the backdrop against which interpretation of the existing
law continued to develop through a series of court cases and administra-
tive decisions, as well as revision of some administrative rules.'
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
Out-of-state printing services continue to present a challenge to taxing
authorities. Following recent legislative changes that impacted the taxa-
bility of out-of-state printing,2 the courts continue to refine the analysis of
such services. In May Department Stores Co. v. Strayhorn, the appellant
sought a refund for use taxes assessed on out-of-state printing services
used to produce advertising materials that were subsequently mailed to
Texas.3 The comptroller argued that the printing charges were for the
sale of tangible personal property and were subject to use tax. The comp-
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1. The Survey period includes November 2003 through November 2004. United
Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Strayhorn, 124 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied),
decided during this Survey period, was included in the previous survey article, Cynthia M.
Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 57 SMU L. REV. 1241, 1244 (2004).
2. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.011(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
3. No. 03-03-007290CV, 2004 WL 1898244, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 26, 2004,
pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
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troller further asserted that May made a taxable use of the materials in
Texas in the manner described in Comptroller's Rule 3.346(b)(3)(A),
which provides that use tax is due on taxable items purchased outside this
state "if the taxable items are delivered at the direction of the purchaser
to recipients in Texas designated by the purchaser."'4 The court rejected
May's argument that Rule 3.346(b)(3)(A) conflicted with the Texas Tax
Code, which does not include "distribution" in the definition of taxable
use.5 The court noted that the comptroller had amended Rule
3.346(b)(3)(A) based on D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, a United States
Supreme Court decision dealing with the interpretation of the Louisiana
use tax statute that specifically included "distribution" in the definition of
taxable use.6 However, the Austin court reasoned (stretched to con-
clude?) that the Supreme Court's ruling in D.H. Holmes did not turn on
the issue of distribution,7 and therefore concluded that the Texas rule
comports with the Texas Tax Code's plain meaning," which is broad
enough to encompass the mailing of items to Texas."' 8 Alternatively, May
had argued that Rule 3.346(b)(3)(A) did not apply because advertising
materials, not printing services, were delivered to Texas; the court dis-
missed this argument, stating that the printing was inextricably inter-
twined with the advertising materials, and without the printing, the
advertising materials would not exist.9 May also argued that the printing
was exempt from Texas use tax because May manufactured the advertis-
ing materials from raw materials out-of-state and then delivered the ad-
vertising into Texas in the same manner as the taxpayer in Sharp v.
Morton Buildings, Inc.10 The court rejected May's analogy to Morton
Buildings for two reasons: (1) the court reasoned that the comptroller
was taxing May for the transformation of the materials instead of the raw
materials themselves; and (2) the court noted that the taxpayer in Morton
Buildings was conducting the manufacturing, whereas the printers, not
May, undertook the transformative act of printing the advertising materi-
als.aa In rejecting each of May's arguments and upholding the lower
court's summary judgment order for the comptroller, the court has fur-
ther encouraged the comptroller to pursue use taxes on materials printed
out-of-state and delivered to in-state residents.
One of the more interesting sales tax cases during the past year, Alpine
Industries, Inc. v. Strayhorn, explored some of the constitutional nexus
4. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §3.346(b)(3)(A) (West 2005) (Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts, Use Tax).
5. May Dep't Stores Co., 2004 WL 1898244, at *5.
6. Id. (citing D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 27 (1988)).
7. Id. (citing D.H. Holmes Co., 486 U.S. at 27)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at *6.
10. Id. at *7; Sharp v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 953 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. App.-Austin
1997, pet. denied).
11. Id. at *8.
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issues that direct sales organizations present. 12 The comptroller deter-
mined that Alpine was required to collect sales tax for its independent
distributors pursuant to section 151.024 of the Tax Code and Comptroller
Rule 3.286(a)(1)(D), which provide that the comptroller may (if the
comptroller determines it is necessary for the efficient administration of
the Texas sales tax) treat representatives, canvassers, and salesmen as
agents of their employers, distributors, or dealers and may regard such
employers, distributors, or dealers as retailers for the purposes of the
Texas sales tax.13 Alpine submitted six arguments supporting its appeal:
(1) the comptroller failed to prove sufficiently Alpine was a direct sales
organization; (2) the sales tax in question violated the commerce clause
of the U.S. Constitution; (3) the comptroller failed to make an individual-
ized determination that Alpine is such an organization and that treating
Alpine as a retailer is necessary for efficient administration of tax code
Section 151; (4) the sales tax violated the due process clause of the U.S.
Constitution; (5) the sales tax violated the equal protection clauses of the
U.S. Constitution and Texas Constitution; and (6) the comptroller failed
to sufficiently prove that she was entitled to summary judgment on her
counterclaim because she refused to issue sales tax permits to each of
Alpine's independent salespersons. 14 The court found that the comptrol-
ler's summary judgment evidence from Alpine's internal manual suffi-
ciently established that Alpine was a direct sales organization that sells its
products through a network of independent salespersons who function in
the same way as representatives, canvassers, and salesmen function. 15
Next, the court rejected Alpine's argument that the comptroller failed to
establish a sufficient Texas nexus because Alpine had no real estate, em-
ployees, inventory, bank accounts, offices or other assets in the state.16
Rather, noted the court the comptroller had provided evidence showing
that the appellant had a network of as many as 20,000 independent sales-
persons in Texas who made sales of over 32 million dollars from 1994-
1998; the court concluded that this network, even though it was com-
prised of independent salespersons, established a sufficient nexus be-
tween Alpine's sales and the state of Texas. 17 The court also summarily
dismissed Alpine's arguments regarding the lack of an individualized de-
termination of the necessity of treating Alpine as a retailer, due process,
equal protection, and the comptroller's failure to issue sales tax permits.1 8
The case thus bolsters the previously-articulated comptroller policy of
12. See Alpine Indus., Inc. v. Strayhom, No. 03-03-00643-CV, 2004 WL 1573159, at *1
(Tex. App.-Austin July 15, 2004, pet. filed).
13. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.024 (Vernon 2002); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE§ 3.286(a)(1)(D) (West 2005) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Seller's & Purchaser's Re-
sponsibilities); Alpine Indus., Inc., 2004 WL 1573159, at *1-2.
14. Alpine Indus., Inc., 2004 WL 1573159, at *1.
15. Id. at *3.
16. Id. at *6.
17. Id. (citing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232(1987), and Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960)).
18. Id. at *4, *7-8.
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subjecting direct sellers with in-state distribution networks to Texas sales
tax obligations.
In USA Waste Services of Houston, Inc. v. Strayhorn, the court ex-
amined the application of the resale exemption to cleanup services pro-
vided by a waste removal company that accidentally spilled waste on a
customer's property. Appellant USA Waste Services ("USAWS") oper-
ated a waste removal business, and in the course of removing waste for
customers, USAWS employees occasionally accidentally spilled liquid
onto a customer's property. When customers called to complain about
the spills, USAWS used an independent company to provide cleanup ser-
vices for the spills. The comptroller assessed sales tax on USAWS for the
purchase of these services, and USAWS protested the assessment by
claiming that the services were exempt under the "sale for resale" exemp-
tion.19 The court disagreed, finding that the spill cleanup services were
not an integral part of USAWS's waste removal services.20 In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted USAWS did not order steam cleaning
every time a spill occurred, and USAWS's own safety manager admitted
that spills occurred only "sometimes. ' 21 Nor was the court persuaded by
USAWS's alternative argument that the comptroller's construction of the
"sale for resale" exemption in the case was inconsistent with its construc-
tion of the exemption in other situations. 22 USAWS cited a number of
examples to support this argument, but the court found each example to
be distinguishable from USAWS's situation.23 The court reasoned that
the spill cleanup services were "more analogous to a construction com-
pany paying for a plant that it accidentally backed over with one of its
trucks" and that the plant replacement "is not an integral part of its ser-
vice, but is instead intended to make the customer whole."
24
Last year's Survey article highlighted the legislature's enactment of
provisions that may impact sales tax rebate contracts between a munici-
pality and certain businesses.2 5 Attorney General Abbott addressed this
legislation in an opinion that points out that although the bill will allow
the comptroller to disregard outlets, offices, facilities or other locations as
a place of business of the retailer if the entity exists to avoid tax or to
rebate to the entities a portion of the tax imposed by Chapter 321 of the
Tax Code, the bill will not void sales tax rebate contracts between munici-
palities and these entities.26 However, the new provisions may result in
making contracts between a municipality less attractive to some entities;
nonetheless the rebate mechanism ought to remain available for those
who are legitimately doing business in the taxing jurisdiction. Attorney
19. USA Waste Servs. of Houston, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 150 S.W.3d 491,493 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2004, pet. denied).
20. Id. at 496.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 497.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §321.002(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
26. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0137 (2004), available at 2004 WL 77808.
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General Abbott also said that the bill will not prohibit municipalities
from executing new contracts.
2 7
The petitioner in Hearing No. 42,539 licensed skyboxes in a basketball
arena from a municipality and then sublicensed the same skyboxes for a
fee that included the price of tickets to events held in the arena as well as
additional fees for the sublicense. 28 The case is interesting for its analysis
of the comptroller's viewpoint, although the language used in the particu-
lar contract (including the licensing provisions) and the omission from the
decision of some key points make it unlikely that similarly situated tax-
payers will view the decision as precedent.2 9 The taxpayer remitted sales
taxes based on the face amount of the admission tickets sold to sublicen-
sees, but not on additional amounts. The taxpayer pointed out that the
additional fees were payments for nontaxable rentals of real property or
for nontaxable sales of intangible rights and that-if the payments were
for amusement services-they were for amusement services "exclusively
provided" by a municipality and therefore exempt. 30 In dismissing the
taxpayer's arguments, the administrative law judge concluded that "the
Comptroller's policy" is to treat both the charge for the use of a facility
and the price of the admission ticket as "part of the total charge for the
amusement service. '31 The limited fact discussion and the judge's sum-
mary dismissal of the taxpayer's invocation of Rylander v. San Antonio
SMSA Ltd. Partnership leave many open questions.3
2
A hearing that highlights the comptroller's renewed attention to deter-
mining when "care, custody, and control" is relevant to resale transac-
tions, Hearing No. 43,728, denied the taxpayer's claimed resale
exemption. Specifically, the comptroller found that the taxpayer could
not claim a resale exemption for telephone equipment that it purchased
for guest use in its hotel rooms.33 While the equipment proved necessary
to the taxpayer's provision of a taxable service, the taxpayer did not
transfer the care, custody and control of the phone equipment to the
guests. The comptroller found that the burden of maintaining and repair-
ing the telephone equipment fell on the taxpayer.34 The administrative
law judge refused to treat the "availability" of the telephone equipment
in the hotel rooms as a transfer to the guests of "custody" of the tele-
phones, as the guests used the equipment for only a limited period of
27. See id.
28. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200406701H (June 8, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
29. The taxpayer sued in district court after losing its battle in the comptroller's ad-
ministrative hearing process.
30. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200406701H (June 8, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
31. Id.
32. Rylander v. San Antonio SMSA Ltd. P'ship, 11 S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App.-Austin,
2000, no pet.).





time.35 Hearing No. 41,730, another hearing dealing with a denied resale
exemption, focused on a private club that claimed its purchase of lockers
was exempt because, after the locker installation, the club rented the
lockers to its members and charged sales tax on the rental fee.36 (Neither
party in this decision questioned the status of the lockers as tangible per-
sonal property). As in the decision above, the comptroller concluded that
the taxpayer did not transfer care, custody, and control of the lockers to
its members.37 In examining which party maintained custody of the prop-
erty, the comptroller found that while the members had custody of the
contents of the lockers, their "use" of the lockers was not synonymous
with "custody. '38 In addition, the taxpayer controlled the members' ac-
cess to the clubhouse, the locker room, and the locker themselves.39 Un-
fortunately, there appears to be continuing confusion regarding these
care, custody, and control issues -particularly in the service and software
context, and in situations in which more than one party has at least some
degree of care, custody, or control over property.
The comptroller relied upon legislative history and court cases from
other states to dismiss the taxpayer's claims in Hearing No. 43,999. 40 The
taxpayer had argued that because telecommunications involved a product
perceptible to the senses, as defined by section 151.009, and because the
transmissions start with electrical impulses, also defined as tangible per-
sonal property in Rule 3.295, the necessary equipment used in the manu-
facturing of its telecommunications product should be tax-exempt. 41 The
comptroller found that telecommunications was legislatively treated as a
service rather than tangible personal property and that the taxpayer's
network equipment did not become tangible personal property because
of the involvement of electricity in the telecommunications process. 42
As in most Survey periods, several hearings focused on the taxability of
various services. Hearing No. 41,876 concluded that the service of haul-
ing goods to be recycled was a taxable real property service. 43 The tax-
payer had argued that because it took title to the paper it removed for
recycling purposes and later resold the paper, it was not performing a
taxable service. The comptroller treated this type of service differently
from one in which a customer contracts with the taxpayer to pick up
records, deliver them to another location and then destroy them; accord-
35. Id.





40. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200403704H (Mar. 26, 2004),
at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
41. Id.
42. Id. This brief reference to a single case cannot do justice to the number and com-
plexity of telecommunications tax issues that flow through the cases and legislative
processes; those are issues for another day.
43. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200401407H (Jan. 14, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
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ing to the comptroller's administrative law judge, the objective of the tax-
payer's service was not to move paper from one location to another for
recycling, but merely to remove garbage or waste from its customers'
premises, regardless of whether the taxpayer had subsequent plans for
the paper.44 In Hearing No. 38,774, the comptroller found that the fact
that model homes would eventually be used as residences brought certain
purchases for the structures within the tax-exemption for real property
services purchased by a contractor as part of an improvement of real
property with a new structure to be used as a residence. 45 The comptrol-
ler concluded, however, that the exemption did not apply to services per-
formed in maintaining the real property while the structures were being
used for other purposes.46
In Hearing No. 42,864, the comptroller determined that in order for the
repaving of a parking lot in concrete to constitute new nontaxable con-
struction, the existing asphalt must be removed down to the dirt.47 The
taxpayer's attempt to show that the asphalt was removed down to the
dirt, by issuing an invoice nearly four years after the transaction occurred,
was insufficient evidence that the transaction was new construction. 48
Additionally, the comptroller found that if only part of the existing park-
ing lot was removed and repaved, a taxable remodeling service oc-
curred.49 It remains difficult to determine with certainty what the
comptroller will consider nontaxable new construction instead of taxable
remodeling. Carried to its logical extreme, the comptroller's insistence
that all of a structure be taken down to ground would mean that the com-
plete rebuilding of an apartment complex would be remodeling if even a
portion of the foundation remained, although that result appears
unjustified.
Hearing No. 43,494 addressed an exemption claimed for items neces-
sary and essential for the production or broadcast of a television station
licensed by the FCC.50 The taxpayer claimed that a helicopter it pur-
chased, and on which it installed cameras for sending live feed to the
television station, was exempt from tax because the helicopter was
adapted to its exclusive use as a camera platform and was used directly in
the production of the taxpayer's news broadcasts. The comptroller dis-
agreed, finding that not only was the helicopter not "necessary and essen-
44. Id.
45. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200309201H (Sept. 24, 2003),
at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
46. For another services decision, see Hearing No. 41,466 (Tex. Comptroller Pub. Ac-
counts STAR System No. 200404596H (Apr. 14, 2004), at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/).
(Taxpayer's provision of services to help determine the losses of individual policyholders so
they could obtain a fair settlement from their insurance providers was taxable service, even
though taxpayer did not provide the service to the insurance companies themselves).








tial" to the production of broadcasts because its use was elective and
restricted to certain occasions, but also that it was used for transportation
activities and therefore, according to the judge, it was excluded from the
exemption. This decision adopts a narrower definition of "necessary and
essential" than the comptroller has articulated in the past and is unfairly
limiting. Under the "optional" standard articulated in this decision, items
that a taxpayer could conceivably get by without (e.g., a new computer)
would not meet the necessary and essential test; however, the comptroller
has not previously adopted such a narrow test. The case is also a good
reminder that purchasing equipment for a helicopter or car separately
from the helicopter or car purchase may facilitate qualifying the equip-
ment for exemption.
In Hearings No. 39,781 and 41,577, the comptroller examined claims
for exemptions from tax for purchases of repair and replacement parts for
pollution control equipment and purchases of environmental repair ser-
vices. 51 The taxpayer produced alumina at its plant. The production pro-
cess included moving the materials through the plant on conveyor belts.
When the conveyors moved the materials through the plant, a dust pollu-
tant was agitated and released into the air. The taxpayer used baghouse
dust collectors to capture the dust and deposit it back onto the conveyors.
While the comptroller allowed refunds for the replacement parts and re-
pairs to the baghouse dust collectors, it refused to grant the conveyors the
same treatment.52 The comptroller found the conveyors at issue to be the
cause of the pollution, rather than equipment used to control the pollu-
tant dust particles; the purchase of replacement parts and their repair did
not qualify for either exemption. 53 This hearing also addressed the ques-
tion of whether cranes that operated on a rail-type system fell under the
definition of "rolling stock." The comptroller concluded that rolling
stock must be traditional railroad equipment or equipment mounted on
rails that connect to traditional railroads. 54 Because the cranes were not
mounted on rails connected to traditional railroad lines, the comptroller
treated them as taxable as intra-plant transportation. 55
Multiple letters addressed the comptroller's analysis of hotel occupancy
tax. The comptroller asserts that when a hotel bills the entire amount of a
package deal to a guest in a lump sum, the entire amount is subject to
hotel tax, even if there is an internal record that breaks the lump sum into
separate amounts. However, the comptroller recognized that no hotel
51. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200401485H (Jan. 13, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
52. Id.
53. In another hearing, Hearing No. 43,251, the comptroller denied an exemption
claim, holding that a microchip identification system for pets was not exempt as a thera-
peutic appliance because the medical devices exemption does not apply to pets. Tex.
Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200310345H (Oct. 23, 2003), at http://
aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.




tax is due when a hotel provides a room or upgrade for awards points,
unless additional consideration was also provided.56 Moreover, if the
amount that the hotel received from an awards fund for the room or up-
grade had previously been paid to the fund by the hotel, then the hotel
received no consideration at the time of booking and no tax would have
been due.57
The comptroller also issued several letters concerning food and drink,
including regarding baked goods sold in money-operated vending ma-
chines, and sales of doughnuts and other baked goods (once again noting
that whether a bakery has eating facilities may determine the taxability of
the items sold, and acknowledging the fact that reheating the baked
goods for the customers did not make the sales taxable).58
Other letters addressed a variety of other issues. A reasonable, tax-
payer-favorable letter provides that when new construction is interrupted
by the initial but temporary occupation of the structure and construction
resumes within a reasonable time under the terms of the original con-
tract, the construction remains nontaxable new construction. 59 The
comptroller treats internet cards and prepaid debit cards like gift certifi-
cates; tax should be collected only when purchases are made with the
cards.60 Neither the enrollment fee for the Medicare Prescription Drug
Discount Card Program nor the transaction fee related to the sale of a
nontaxable drug or medicine is taxable. 61 Writing or editing is not a taxa-
ble service, provided the processes are more than merely word processing
services.62 Doctors may claim a manufacturing exemption on equipment
used to manufacture lenses for glasses if they are sold separately from the
56. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200405578L (May 17, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/; Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No.
200401318L (Jan. 8, 2004), at http://aixtep.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
57. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200401343L (Jan. 23, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
58. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200402375L (Feb. 4, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/. Another letter found that sushi rolled at the grocery
store's premises is subject to tax while sushi rolled off premises is not, provided it is sold
without utensils. (There's that eating utensil rule again.) Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts
STAR System No. 200402371L (Feb. 3, 2004), at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/. Personal
chefs, take note: preparing meals at a client's home for consumption is not subject to tax,
while catering services generally are taxable, although the caterers may claim exemptions
for equipment used to cook. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No.
200405579L (May 17, 2004), at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/. (Yes, we know that per-
sonal chefs won't really read this article. Why include these rulings? To show the difficulty
involved in attempting to draw lines between taxable and nontaxable items, and because
food is almost always worth discussing.).
59. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200312323L (Dec. 12, 2003), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
60. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200403419L (Mar. 2, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
61. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200405590L (May 24, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.






In November 2004, Congress passed the Internet Access Nondiscrimi-
nation Act extending the moratorium on state and local Internet access
taxes for another four years. The legislation also extends the grandfather
clause permitting Internet access taxes imposed and enforced prior to Oc-
tober 1, 1998. The definition of exempt Internet access has been ex-
panded to include telecommunications services "to the extent such
services are purchased, used, or sold by a provider of Internet access to
provide Internet access."'64 The bill further states that taxation for ser-
vices using Voice Over Internet Protocol remain unaffected. 65 Otherwise
exempt Internet access services could be taxed if bundled with taxable
services unless the provider can reasonably identify the charges for the
Internet access from books and records kept in the regular course of busi-
ness.66 In addition, the moratorium amends the definition of "tax on In-
ternet access" specifically to include taxes imposed on either the provider
or buyer of Internet access. 67 Texas municipal access line fees will remain
unaffected. 68
Texas continues to move toward compliance with the Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement but continues to face challenges in compliance.
As noted in last year's Survey,69 the Texas legislature modified certain
sourcing rules in an effort to move closer to the destination-sourcing re-
quired by the Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement. However, the comptrol-
ler has delayed applying these new sourcing rules for local sales tax.70
During the delay for implementing these rules the comptroller intends to
develop online and printed resources to help taxpayers understand the
changes. 71 The comptroller notice further provides that taxpayers who
already switched over to the new short form may continue to use it during
the delay period. 72 However, the new sourcing rules do not reach all ser-
vices; the 2003 sourcing legislation does not apply to certain services that
first became taxable in 1987.7 3
63. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200309098L (Sept. 8, 2003), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.us/star/.
64. Internet Access Bill, S. 150, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004).
65. See id. § 6.
66. See id. § 4.
67. See id. § 2.
68. See id. § 3.
69. See Ohlenforst et al., supra note 1, at 1248-49.
70. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts Notice: Delay in Implementation of Changes to
Local Sales and Use Taxes, at http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/sales/localtax-change.
html (last visited May 9, 2005).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 323.203(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
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C. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The comptroller amended several sales tax rules during the Survey pe-
riod. Some of the regulatory changes reflect prior legislative changes,
whereas others set forth comptroller policies. Rule 3.325 was amended to
clarify the comptroller's position (which was codified by the Legislature
in 2003) on refunds of taxes paid in error by taxpayers with and without
sales and use tax permits. 74 The changes reflect the comptroller's policy
that a person without a permit who paid taxes in error to a permitted
seller may only request a refund from said seller, whereas a permit holder
who has paid tax in error directly to the comptroller may request a refund
from the comptroller.7 5 A permit holder who erred in paying tax to an-
other permitted seller has the option of requesting a refund from either
the seller or the comptroller. 76 Motor vehicle sales and use tax Rule 3.96
was altered to correspond with changes made by 2003 legislation which
imposed a surcharge on the purchase of diesel-powered vehicles with a
gross registered weight in excess of 14,000 pounds.77
Rule 3.318 was amended: (1) to conform with prior legislation which
changed the name of the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commis-
sion to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality; and (2) to clar-
ify that the water-related exemption applies to equipment, services, or
supplies used solely for certain water-related qualified conservation activ-
ities. 78 The comptroller also finalized revisions to Rule 3.331 concerning
the exemption for intercorporate services. 7 9 The comptroller added a
provision to Rule 3.5 which provides that, if the comptroller's office de-
nies a waiver request for a penalty and the taxpayer contests the denial,
then the standard of review will be based on the same factors considered
by the comptroller's office in issuing the denial.80 The comptroller also
amended rules concerning certain exempt medical devices,8 1 the applica-
tion of the manufacturing exemption to pharmaceutical biotechnology
74. 29 Tex. Reg. 2606-08 (2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 5415 (2004) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.325).
75. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.325(a)(l)-(2) (West 2005) (Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts, Refunds, Interest, & Payments Under Protest (TAX CODE ANN. § 111.104(d)
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005)).
76. Id. § 3.325(a)(3).
77. 29 Tex. Reg. 7657 (2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 5410 (2004) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.96(a)-(b), (f)).
78. 29 Tex. Reg. 7657 (2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 9551 (2004) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.318(a)(7), (b)).
79. 29 Tex. Reg. 5415-16 (2004) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.331(c)).
80. 29 Tex. Reg. 2602-03 (2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 4551 (2004) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.5(b)(8)). Regardless of the factors listed in this rule, many comptroller
auditors and tax division attorneys appear extremely reluctant to recommend penalty
waiver.
81. 29 Tex. Reg. 7647-50 (2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 10581 (2004) (codified at 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.284(11)(a)).
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cleanrooms, 82 the exemption for certain low-cost newspapers, 83 the
comptroller's authorization of the use of electronic signatures on resale
certificates, 84 and taxation of customs brokers.85
II. FRANCHISE TAX
Taxpayers continue to fare poorly both with administrative law judges
and in Austin courts regarding their challenges to the franchise tax. An-
derson-Clayton Brothers Funeral Home, Inc. 86 illustrates the continuing
difficulty that taxing authorities face in attempting to apply consistent
principles for taxing trusts and partnerships. Anderson-Clayton, a group
of affiliated funeral homes, deposited proceeds from certain pre-paid fu-
neral benefits into trusts. The parties agreed that the subsequently-
earned investment earnings on the pre-paid funeral benefits came from
out-of-state corporations. Anderson-Clayton asserted that the out-of-
state corporations were the payors so that, pursuant to Texas' long-estab-
lished "location of payor rule," the earnings should be treated as non-
Texas receipts. The comptroller, on the other hand, asserted that the
earnings were derived from the Texas trusts and should be treated as
Texas receipts, thereby increasing the proportion of Anderson-Clayton's
receipts that are subject to franchise tax. The parties focused on the in-
terpretation of section 171.1121(b), which requires a corporation to use
the same "accounting methods" to apportion taxable earned surplus as
used in computing its reportable taxable federal income.87 Anderson-
Clayton asserted that, because the trusts were ignored for federal income
tax purposes, this rule required ignoring the trusts for sourcing purposes
and looking to the non-Texas investment vehicles. The court, while ac-
knowledging that the comptroller's position regarding the statute had
continued to evolve during the appeal, nonetheless gave great credence
to her argument that section 171.1121(b) is limited to accounting method-
ologies and that the source of the earnings ought to be determined by
reference to Texas tax and trust law.88 At some points, although not con-
sistently throughout the litigation, the comptroller also attempted to rely
on section 171.1121(c) which prohibits consolidated reporting. 89 As in
other circumstances involving partnerships and trusts, the comptroller ap-
pears to have difficulty in finding a consistent argument for determining
the receipts and income of entities that hold interests in partnerships and
82. 29 Tex. Reg. 7652-57 (2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 9551 (2004) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.300(a)(14), (f), (k)(3)(F)).
83. 29 Tex. Reg. 7652 (2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 9551 (2004) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.299(a)(1)(B)).
84. 29 Tex. Reg. 7650-51 (2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 9550-51 (2004) (codified at 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285(g)(4)).
85. 29 Tex. Reg. 7992-97 (2004) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.360(p)(10),
(q)(9)).
86. 149 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed).
87. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1121 (Vernon 2002).
88. See Anderson-Clayton, 149 S.W.3d at 173-79.
89. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1121(c) (Vernon 2002).
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trusts. Nonetheless, in this case, the court ultimately accepted the comp-
troller's argument that section 171.1121(b) was not intended "to govern
the sourcing of [the] gross receipts" and that the statute's reference to
accounting methods related "primarily to the timing of revenue and in-
come recognition" rather than to its sourcing.90
The Anderson-Clayton dissenting opinion noted that the legislature
used the term "apportioned" throughout to refer to the allocation or at-
tribution of receipts to Texas versus elsewhere, 91 and that the majority
should not construe the subsection otherwise. The dissent concluded that
because the trusts are ignored for federal tax purposes they should also
be treated as if they did not exist for apportionment purposes, 92 so that
the trusts should not be treated as the payors.
Hearing No. 43,065 addresses the revenues from a taxpayer's sale of
geophysical data.93 The sale of data at issue was pursuant to a master
license agreement and involved data provided on magnetic tape for disk.
The taxpayer argued that, under these circumstances, the receipts from its
data sales should be treated no differently from the receipts for its licens-
ing of its computer program. The hearing highlights the differences be-
tween revenues from a license, which are Texas receipts to the extent the
license is used in Texas, 94 and gross receipts from the sale of an intangible,
which are generally based on the location of payor rule,95 which treats
receipts from the sale of an intangible asset as allocable to the legal domi-
cile of the payor. Relying in part on a 2002 letter ruling in which the
comptroller concluded (somewhat oddly) that receipts from a seismic
data work for a specific customer are sourced according to the location
where the service is performed,96 but that services that are not for a spe-
cific customer are sourced under the licensing rules, the administrative
law judge concluded that the apportionment for the receipts from sales of
geographical data at issue must be sourced based on the use of a license.
(Query whether this case provides an opportunity for taxpayers to struc-
ture certain sales as licenses, and source receipts on usage rather than on
the place where services are performed.) The administrative law judge
also upheld the tax division's argument that the sourcing should be based
90. Anderson-Clayton, 149 S.W.3d at 174-75.
91. Id. at 180
92. Id. at 181.
93. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200409943H (Sept. 3, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star. As indicated by the comptroller's raising (but later with-
drawing) an argument concerning § 171.1121(c), which prohibits consolidated reporting,
there is still some confusion and inconsistency in the comptroller's explanation of how the
receipts of a separate entity like a trust (or partnership) are nonetheless treated as the
receipts of the beneficiary (or partner).
94. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1032(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2005-05); 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.557(e)(25)(A)(iii) (West 2005) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Earned Surplus,
Apportionment).
95. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(e)(6).
96. This conclusion would be consistent with the general rule for franchise tax that the
sourcing of services is based on the location where the services were performed. See 34




on the billing or ship-to address; while noting that the tax division pro-
vided no support for its claim that this mechanism is consistent with
comptroller policy, the judge also noted that the taxpayer had not pro-
vided any authority for a contrary position.
Among the other franchise tax hearings issued during the Survey pe-
riod are three that dealt with identifying unitary versus non-unitary in-
come. Not surprisingly, given the trend of franchise tax decisions in
recent years, the taxpayers lost all three because the administrative lawjudges held in each case that the taxpayer failed to carry its burden of
proof. The decisions thus held that capital gains related to a Canadian
tax refund,97 receipts from the sale of stock, 98 and capital gains from the
sale of an Internet subscriber list99 were unitary income on the facts of
the respective cases. The comptroller also issued several franchise tax
letter rulings during the Survey period, including one that addressed the
interplay with section 336 of the Internal Revenue Code. 100
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAx/ExEMPTIONS
In West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District v. Nel-
son,10 1 a Travis County district court ruled that the Texas public school
finance system is unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) it violates Article
VII, section 1-e of the Texas Constitution because the $1.50 cap on main-
tenance and operation ("M&O") property tax rates in the plaintiff school
districts must be imposed to provide a constitutionally adequate educa-
tion, thereby denying the school districts meaningful discretion in setting
M&O property tax rates; (2) it violates the "general diffusion of knowl-
edge" clause (or adequacy clause) set forth in Article VII, section 1 of the
Texas Constitution because the constitutional mandate of adequacy ex-
ceeds the maximum amount of funding that is available under Texas' cur-
rent funding formulas for the plaintiff school districts; and (3) the system
is financially inefficient, inadequate, and unsuitable, in violation of Arti-
cle VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution 102 because the system fails to
recognize or cover the costs of meeting the constitutional mandate of ad-
equacy. 10 3 The trial court ruled that it would enjoin the Texas public
school financing system unless the Texas legislature revises the system to
meet constitutional standards; however, the effective date of the injunc-
97. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200402500H (Feb. 4, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star.
98. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200404592H (Apr. 16, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star.
99. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200405648 (May 13, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star.
100. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200405664L (May 19, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star.
101. No. GV-100528 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov. 30, 2004) (on file with
author).
102. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
103. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Ind. Sch. Dist., No. GV-100528, at 7.
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tion is October 1, 2005, giving the legislature one year to remedy the con-
stitutional defects.' 0 4 The state has appealed this decision to the Texas
Supreme Court.10 5
The current school funding financing system was adopted in 1993, with
slight modifications since then.106 Under this system, public education is
financed primarily with local funds raised from property taxes.1 0 7 School
districts may set two property tax rates each year, a M&O rate for regular
operating expenses, and an interest and sinking fund rate for servicing
debt.108 M&O rates generally cannot exceed $1.50 per $100 taxable
value. 10 9 The system relies on the "Foundation School Program" to at-
tempt to provide constitutionally-permissible school financing throughout
the state. Under Tier 1, school districts taxing at an M&O rate of $0.86
per $100 taxable value are entitled to a basic allotment of $2,537 for each
student in average daily attendance, subject to many adjustments. 110 If
the $0.86 tax rate fails to produce the $2,537 allotment (as adjusted), the
state makes up the difference."' Under Tier 2, the state guarantees a
yield of $27.14 per weighted student for every cent of tax beyond the
$0.86 tax rate up to the $1.50 M&O tax rate cap, with the state making up
the difference. 112 The finance system also established an equalized
wealth level among school districts, requiring school districts with more
than $305,000 of property wealth per student to reduce their wealth by
effectively paying to the state (or using other means) taxes on this excess
wealth (this is commonly referred to as the Robinhood provision). 1 3 The
state then distributes these recaptured funds to property-poor districts."
4
With respect to the "meaningful discretion" ruling above, the court
concluded that the state has not adjusted the funding formulas to keep
pace with rising costs and school obligations, and thus school districts are
forced to use a $1.50 M&O tax rate."15 In attempting to demonstrate the
court's position, the court noted that in 1994, only twenty-five school dis-
tricts taxed at the $1.50 rate and a substantial majority were below $1.40;
currently, almost all school districts are at $1.40 or higher and almost
50% are at the $1.50 rate." 6 The court also concluded that the school
finance system is out of capacity-i.e., there are no other sources of fund-
ing to meet adequate standards of education. 1 7 The state argued that the
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id.
108. Id. The interest and sinking fund rate is generally capped at $0.50 per $100 taxable
value.
109. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.003(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
110. Id. §§ 42.101, 42.252(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
111. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Ind. Sch. Dist., No. GV-100528, at 9.
112. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.302(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
113. Id. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
114. See id. § 41.003 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
115. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Ind. Sch. Dist., No. GV-100528, at 31.




local option homestead exemption provides school districts with "mean-
ingful discretion" because school districts could elect to revoke this ex-
emption to raise more revenue or to lower their M&O tax rate.
However, the court noted that only one of the plaintiff school districts
offered this exemption and that less than one percent of school finance
revenue was lost due to the optional homestead exemption."18
With respect to the "adequacy" issues, the court reviewed a study of
Texas school funding prepared by an expert hired by the plaintiff school
districts and a study prepared by an expert hired by the state. The court
was highly critical of the study prepared on behalf of the state and gener-
ally accepted the conclusions of the study prepared on behalf of the plain-
tiffs. 119 The court concluded that many school districts lack sufficient
funds to provide adequate education even while taxing at or near the
$1.50 M&O tax rate cap. 120
In a case demonstrating the importance of careful drafting of leases of
property by tax-exempt owners to taxable lessees, the Austin Court of
Appeals in Travis Central Appraisal District v. Signature Flight Support
Corp.12 1 held that improvements constructed by lessees and sublessees on
property owned by a municipality were treated for property tax purposes
as municipal property, and thus exempt from tax. 122 The appraisal dis-
trict asserted that these improvements were lessee or sublessee-owned
property and thus taxable. Generally, only the fee simple interest in real
property is subject to property tax in Texas. 123 Property owned by a mu-
nicipality is exempt from property taxes if it is used for a public pur-
pose. 24 The lessees/sublessees were not exempt; thus, the determination
of the ownership of the lessee/sublessee constructed improvements was
critical in deciding whether these improvements are subject to property
tax.
Because the Tax Code does not define the term "owner," the court
looked to common law on the issue. 125 "The general rule is that improve-
ments ... belong to the landowner unless there is [(a)] an understanding
between the parties that the improvements are not part of the land, or
[(b)] evidence showing intent of the improver that the improvements re-
main personally with the right to be removed.' 2 6 Neither of these ex-
118. Id. at 34.
119. Id. at 61-64.
120. Id. at 59.
121. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Signature Flight Support Corp., 140 S.W.3d 833(Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
122. Id. at 845.
123. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2004-05). One exception to this
rule in section 25.07 of the Tax Code provides that a leasehold interest in real property that
is exempt from taxation is generally taxable. Id. § 25.07(a). However, this provision did
not apply in Signature Flight Support Corp. because this statute exempts a public transpor-
tation facility owned by a municipality-the improvements at issue fit within this excep-
tion. Id. § 25.07(b).
124. Id. § 11.11(a).
125. Signature Flight Support Corp., 140 S.W.3d at 839-40.
126. Id. at 838.
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ceptions applied in Signature Flight Support Corp.
12 7 Moreover, the
municipality's lease expressly provided that legal title to improvements
constructed by the lessee shall vest in the city at the end of the lease
term.' 2 8 The court was not influenced by language in one of the subleases
indicating that improvements would be owned by the sublessee because
the sublessor could not convey to the sublessee more than the sublessor
owned under its lease with the municipality.
12 9 Finally, the court rejected




In Marubeni America Corp. v. Harris County Appraisal District,
131 a
Houston court of appeals held that mistakes the taxpayer allegedly made
in calculating its inventory for purposes of preparing a rendition were not
"clerical errors" within the meaning of section 25.25(c) of the Tax
Code. 132 Under section 25.25(c), the appraisal review board, on motion
of the appraisal district, or a taxpayer, may direct that the appraisal roll
be changed for any of the five preceding years "to correct clerical errors
that affect" a taxpayer's property tax liability.
133 The term "clerical er-
ror" is defined for this purpose as, among other things, "an error that is
or results from a mistake or failure in writing, copying, transcribing, en-
tering or retrieving computer data, computing or calculating.'
34 In Mar-
ubeni, the taxpayer alleged that it rendered its 2001 inventory for more
than double its actual value because the 2001 inventory report used to
render such property was incorrect, both in terms of the amount of assets
taxpayer had as of January 1, 2001 and the value of such assets.
135
The taxpayer relied on Comdisco, Inc. v. Tarrant County Appraisal Dis-
trict136 in support of its assertion that its alleged rendition error was a
clerical error. In Comdisco, the taxpayer submitted information to a tax-
ing unit listing the value of its property at $13,000,000 instead of
$1,300,000. In rejecting the taxpayer's argument, the court in Marubeni
concluded that while a decimal error is a clerical error, simply submitting
improper figures based on allegedly incorrect information is not a clerical
error.
13 7
127. Id. at 839.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 839, 841-42.
130. Id. at 840.
131. Marubeni Am. Corp. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 01-04-00107-CV, 2004
WL 2306712 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14, 2004, no pet.).
132. Id. at *3-4; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)(1) (Vernon 2001).
133. Id. at *34.
134. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.04(18)(A) (Vernon 2001).
135. Marubeni Am. Corp., 2004 WL 2306712, at *1.
136. Comdisco, Inc. v. Tarrant County Appraisal Dist., 927 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ ref'd).
137. Marubeni Am. Corp., 2004 WL 2306712, at *3. It appears that the taxpayer would
have had a much better chance of prevailing if it could have traced exactly how the im-
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ABT Galveston Ltd. Partnership v. Galveston Central Appraisal Dis-
trict138 is more proof that taxpayers must comply with the administrative
rules for contesting property taxes and values. In this case, ABT entered
into a tax abatement agreement with tax units concerning a $23 million
automated grain bagging and loading facility to be constructed by
ABT.139 The abatement agreements were entered into in 1994 and pro-
vided for seven-year abatements of 100% of the value of the facility.140
The abatement agreements provided that the tax units could terminate
the agreements if ABT defaulted and did not cure within sixty days of
notice. 141 These agreements also include what are commonly referred to
as "clawbacks," whereby the taxpayer is required to pay back abated
taxes if it defaults and does not cure.142 ABT constructed the facility in
early 1996 and filed in April 1996 for the tax abatement for the 1996 tax
year. 143 By the end of 1996, ABT was in serious financial distress, and its
lender began foreclosure proceedings.144 ABT's lender ultimately sold
the facility. During the last few months of 1996, each relevant tax unit
sent ABT a letter informing it that ABT was in default of its tax abate-
ment agreements. In December 1996, the tax assessor for the relevant tax
units sent ABT tax bills showing a $21.6 million taxable value for the
facility and no exemptions. ABT's lender paid these tax bills in full, but
later protested the taxes. 145
ABT protested the 1996 taxes based on its belief that the appraisal
district failed to give relevant notices, including: (1) notice of default of
the tax abatement agreements; (2) the tax units decision to cancel the
exemptions under the tax abatement agreements; (3) failure to give time
to cure defaults; (4) failure to notify ABT of the removal of the tax ex-
emption; and (5) failure to notify ABT of the appraised value of the facil-
ity. Section 11.43(h) of the Tax Code146 requires an appraisal district to
notify a property owner if the appraisal district determines that a previ-
ously allowed exemption should be cancelled within five days after the
date he makes such cancellation.1 47 Section 25.19 requires the appraisal
district to deliver to the taxpayer by May 15 of each tax year or as soon
thereafter as practicable, written notice of the appraised value of the tax-
payer's property. 148
The court concluded that ABT had been informed (apparently infor-
proper renditions were made. The court seemed frustrated with the taxpayer's lack of
evidence in this regard. Id.
138. ABT Galveston Ltd. P'ship v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 137 S.W.3d 146(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
139. Id. at 147-48.





145. Id. at 149-50.
146. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43(h) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 25.19(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
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mally) as early as June 1996 of the appraised value of the facility;149 how-
ever, the court reasoned that even if such notices had not been sent, ABT
had not pursued and exhausted its administrative remedies, and thus
could not properly file suit.150 Under section 41.44, a taxpayer must file a
written protest with the appraisal review board within thirty days of re-
ceiving a notice of appraised value. 151 In addition, a taxpayer can also
protest an appraisal district's failure to provide any notice to which the
taxpayer is entitled, provided that the protest is filed before the date the
taxes on the relevant property become delinquent. 152 However, ABT did
not file its protest of the 1996 taxes until May 1998, well after the 1996
taxes were delinquent. A taxpayer's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies deprives a trial court jurisdiction to hear the taxpayer's
claims. 153
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Cooke County Tax Appraisal Dis-
trict v. Tee1154 addressed whether taxpayers had complied with adminis-
trative procedures in order to challenge the improper denial of
agricultural-use valuation on their property. In Teel, the taxpayers pur-
chased property that qualified for agricultural-use property in December
1999 but with an effective date of January 6, 2000.155 The appraisal dis-
trict erroneously recorded the transfer date as December 15, 1999 and
sent a notice of appraised value to the new owners showing full taxable
value for the 2000 year.156 The taxpayers protested and lost. The ap-
praisal district then attempted to notify in writing the taxpayers of the
denial of protest, but in spite of the post office's numerous attempts to
deliver the notice to the taxpayers, it was not actually delivered to the
taxpayers until July 2001.157 The taxpayers filed a petition for review in
district court within forty-five days after actual delivery of the denial of
protest.158
The appraisal district first argued that the taxpayers failed to timely
apply for the agricultural-use valuation and to file a timely protest. Ap-
plications for agricultural-use valuation must be filed on or before the
date the appraisal review board approves the appraisal records.
159 Pro-
tests must be filed before June 1 or the 30th day after the date the notice
was delivered to the taxpayer, whichever is later. 160 However, the tax-
149. ABT Galveston Ltd. P'ship, 137 S.W.3d at 153.
150. Id. at 154.
151. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.44(a)(1) (Vernon 2001).
152. Id. § 41.411(a).
153. Id. ABT may have claims against the tax units for failing to provide default no-
tices, as such notices should have been sent by them and not by the appraisal district. See
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05).
154. Cooke County Tax Appraisal Dist. v. Teel, 129 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2004, no pet.).
155. Id. at 726.
156. Id. at 727.
157. Id. at 730.
158. Id.
159. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.541(a) (Vernon 2001).
160. Id. § 41.44.
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payers filed their protest under section 25.25(c) of the Tax Code, which
allows taxpayers to protest, among other things, clerical errors for the
current tax year or any of the five preceding tax years.161 Moreover, the
appraisal review board heard the matter and issued an order, which is the
only prerequisite for appeal. 162 The appraisal district also asserted that
the taxpayers did not timely file a petition for review in district court
because of their position that the taxpayers had constructive receipt of
earlier attempted deliveries of notice of denial of protest.163 The court
rejected this argument because the earlier notices were delivered to the
wrong address, and an incorrect address overrides the presumption of de-
livery when a notice is sent by first-class mail. 164
In Pierce v. Pierce, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a prop-
erty tax sale that occurred minutes after the debtor filed for bankruptcy
was invalid. 165 In this case, the debtor, Pierce, failed to pay property
taxes on her residence for the 1998 and 1999 tax years. 166 In 2000 the tax
units obtained a default judgment against Pierce and began foreclosure
proceedings. 167 The constable sold the property at a foreclosure sale but
two days later received notice that the debtor had filed for bankruptcy
thirty minutes before the tax sale.168 Prior to the sale, the constable did
not have actual or constructive notice of such bankruptcy filing.169 The
purchaser asserted that it obtained the mortgagee's security interest in
the property because the mortgagee was a named co-defendant in the tax
deficiency suit. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the sale
was invalid because the bankruptcy stayed the foreclosure proceedings,
making them null and without legal effect. 170
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held in Rourk v. Cameron Ap-
praisal District'7' that travel trailers and park model recreational vehicles
are personal property for property tax purposes, and thus generally ex-
empt from taxation.172 Rourk was a class action filed on behalf of indi-
viduals owning travel trailers and park model recreational vehicles
situated on rented space in trailer parks or trailer courts in Cameron
County, Texas. 173 The appraisal district attempted to impose property
taxes on these properties. However, the taxpayers asserted that the trail-
ers and vehicles were exempt under section 11.14(a) of the Tax Code,
161. Id. § 25.25(c)(1).
162. Teel, 129 S.W.3d at 728-29.
163. Id. at 729.
164. Id. at 730.







171. Rourk v. Cameron Appraisal Dist., 131 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2004, pet. filed).
172. Id. at 296-97.
173. Id. at 289.
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which provides an exemption for "tangible personal property, other than
manufactured homes that the person owns and that is not held or used for
production of income.' '1 74
The appraisal district first argued that the trailers and vehicles are taxa-
ble under Article VIII, section 1(d)(2) of the Texas Constitution, which
provided during the relevant years that the Texas legislature could not
exempt personal property used as residential dwellings.175 The key issue
in this regard is whether such trailer and vehicles are residential dwell-
ings. The appraisal district asserted that the taxpayers admitted that the
trailers and vehicles are residential dwellings because the taxpayers called
such property "dwellings." However, the court stated that a dwelling is
not necessarily the same as a residential dwelling.
176
The appraisal district then argued that section 11.14(a) is unconstitu-
tional because it violates Article VIII, section 1(d)(2) of the Texas Consti-
tution by exempting residential dwellings.1 77 The court disagreed,
reasoning that the Texas legislature's intent was that only manufactured
homes are within the meaning of Article VIII, section 1(d)(2).178 Finally,
the appraisal district argued that the trailers and vehicles at issue are not
personal property but are instead improvements. The court rejected this
argument, stating that the trailers and vehicles were transportable-
merely holing up the vehicles to the site did not result in the vehicle
owner's ceding ownership to the park operators.
1 79
In Cordillera Ranch, Ltd. v. Kendall County Appraisal District,1 80 the
San Antonio Court of Appeals held that each property owner in a wild-
life management cooperative must independently qualify for open-space
valuation as wildlife management property.1 81 To qualify for open-space
land appraisal as wildlife management property, the land must be actively
used in at least three of the following seven ways: habitat control; erosion
control; predator control; providing supplemental supplies of water; pro-
viding supplemental supplies of food; providing shelters; or making of
census counts to determine population. 182 The specific issue for a wildlife
co-op is whether each owner in the co-op must individually meet the
three of seven tests, or whether the entire co-op must meet these tests.
The court stated that exemptions must be construed strictly.183 Given
that there is no affirmative indication in the relevant statute that the tests
would be judged based on the activities of a wildlife co-op as a whole, the
court concluded that the statute should be interpreted against broadening
174. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.14(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
175. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)(2).
176. Rourk, 131 S.W.3d at 294.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 295.
179. Id. at 295, 297.
180. Cordillera Ranch, Ltd. v. Kendall County Appraisal Dist., 136 S.W.3d 249 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
181. Id. at 258.
182. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.51(7) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).





A. OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY, STATUTES OF LIMITATION, AND OTHER
SAD STORIES...
Successor liability remains a trap for the unwary who fail to recognize
that under Texas law, a purchaser of assets can be held liable as a succes-
sor for certain tax liabilities of the asset seller.18 5 In Hearing No. 43,660,
the administrative law judge held that a purchaser of inventory who con-
tinued to operate a convenience store at the same location as the seller
was liable for the seller's tax liability, notwithstanding the fact that the
sale did not include the sale of goodwill.186 The tax division prevailed
again in Hearing No. 43,978 in which the petitioner had purchased caf6
inventory and restaurant equipment from an individual who subsequently
declared bankruptcy. In neither of these cases was the seller able to pre-
sent sufficient evidence or arguments to controvert the tax division's posi-
tion that the buyer was responsible for taxes. The successor liability
provisions can be particularly harsh in a case like Hearing No. 43,978 in
which the predecessor's tax liability exceeded the purchase price that the
buyer paid for the assets. The limitation on successor liability to the
amount of purchase price is cold comfort for an asset buyer in this
situation.
Taxpayers lost not only several successor liability cases but also several
statute of limitations cases. In Hearing No. 42,309,187 the taxpayer ar-
gued unsuccessfully that its audit constituted an administrative proceed-
ing that should have tolled the statute of limitations, while in Hearing No.
43,276, a taxpayer lost its argument that statute of limitations should be
open as to issues that were not involved in its deficiency determination. 18
However, there is some good news on the claim for refund front. In
Strayhorn v. Lexington Insurance Co., affiliated insurance companies ar-
gued that the unauthorized insurance premium tax does not apply to eli-
gible surplus lines insurers.18 9 Although the court held that the surplus
lines policies must be issued through a licensed agent or be independently
procured to avoid the tax issue, the court did not accept the comptroller's
184. Id. at 253-54. The taxpayer attempted to rely on state government publications
which promote wildlife co-ops, but the court noted that "the agencies require individual
assessment of each tract of land seeking to qualify for open-space exemption." Id. at 255.
The court does note that "[w]here several tracts are under the same ownership, the owner
may include his multiple [properties] in a single application" for open-space valuation. Id.
185. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.020 (Vernon 2001).
186. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200405699H (May 5, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
187. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200404598H (April 7, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
188. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200406697H (June 8, 2004), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
189. Strayhorn v. Lexington Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet.
filed).
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argument that the taxpayers failed to exhaust their administrative reme-
dies. The insurance companies both filed protest letters with payment
and moved forward in an administrative hearing. The comptroller argued
that the protest, letters and payments set the stage for a protest suit under
section 112.052 of the Tax Code, but the taxpayers failed to file suit within
the ninety day period required by that statute.1 90 Although the court re-
fused to treat the insurer's protest letters by themselves as refund claims
(because the letters did not specifically ask for a refund or seek return of
the money under protest), the court concluded that the motions for re-
hearing that had been filed as part of the administrative hearing process
did request a refund; the court therefore held that the insurers "substan-
tially met the Tax Code requirements." This is an interesting decision
and is well supported by the court's policy analysis; it is likely to give rise
to numerous claims by other taxpayers that they have substantially com-
plied with procedural requirements.19'
Wimmer v. Texas reiterates the importance of a taxpayer's ability to
carry its burden of proof once it reaches the courthouse. Wimmer was
the owner of a business appealing from a summary judgment that granted
the State of Texas and the City of Galveston a judgment for unpaid sales
taxes, penalties, and interest, plus court costs and attorney's fees.192 Al-
though the case is a sales tax case, its relevance to this Survey is to
demonstrate the burden of proof a taxpayer must meet to prevail in a tax
collection case. Wimmer raised two substantive issues, and the court
found against Wimmer on both arguments. First, Wimmer asserted, the
state's evidence was conflicting and legally insufficient to justify the lower
court's grant of summary judgment.' 93 The court not only found that the
state met its summary judgment burden by producing two certificates of
delinquency from the office of the comptroller evidencing the amount of
taxes owed along with penalties and interest, but also found Wimmer's
evidence to the contrary was "no more than a vague allegation that the
comptroller erroneously ascertained the amount of taxes due. ' 194 The
court also dispensed with the taxpayer's alternative argument that the
trial court improperly enjoined him from continuing to operate a business
by finding that "the State established as a matter of law its entitlement to
an injunction and the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction in
granting injunctive relief."' 95 Finding for the state on all issues, the court
affirmed the district court's judgment that Wimmer was liable for the
amounts in question and that the district court properly granted injunc-
tive relief.
190. Id. at 777 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.052(b) (Vernon 2001)).
191. The comptroller revised several procedural rules, including those concerning re-
funds, during the Survey period. Taxpayers should review those rules in connection with
administrative hearings, filing claims for refund and other administrative matters.
192. Wimmer v. Texas, No. 03-03-00135-CV, 2004 WL 210629, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin
Feb. 5, 2004, pet. denied).
193. Id. at *3.
194. Id. at *3-5.
195. Id. at *5-6.
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While it is essential to provide adequate proof in tax cases, taxpayers
who provide documentation to the comptroller's office should recognize
the uncertainty that exists as to the comptroller's right to maintain the
confidentiality of such materials. This uncertainty arises in part from
opinions issued by the Attorney General during 2004 that appear to make
it more likely that the comptroller's office may be required to release
certain information in response to open records request. 196
Even law review articles on taxes should end on a positive note. With
that thought in mind, it is noteworthy that the comptroller adopted a tax
amnesty program that began on March 11, 2004 and ended on March 31,
2004. Although other states periodically adopt amnesty programs, they
are not often used in Texas. The relief available under the amnesty pro-
gram was similar in many respects to that available under Texas' volun-
tary disclosure agreement program. However, the amnesty program was
heavily publicized, applied to certain fact patterns that would not have
been eligible for voluntary disclosure agreements, and moved on a faster
track. These factors contributed to Texas receiving more than 265 million
dollars from this program. 197
As this survey article goes to press, the Texas legislature is once again
in session and is once again struggling to revise the Texas tax system.
Regardless of whether the legislators' struggles are successful, they are
certain to produce new and different topics (and perhaps new and differ-
ent taxes) for next year's Survey.
196. See, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-2858 (2004).
197. Texas Comptroller Carole Keeton Strayhorn's e-Newsletter for Friday, June 3,
2005 (on file with SMU Law Review Association).
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